This paper examines quantitatively the potential for monetary policy to avoid self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises. We combine a version of the slow-moving debt crisis model proposed by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) with a standard New Keynesian model. We consider both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Under conventional policy the central bank can preclude a debt crisis through inflation, lowering the real interest rate and raising output. These reduce the real value of the outstanding debt and the cost of new borrowing, and increase tax revenues and seigniorage. Unconventional policies take the form of liquidity support or debt buyback policies that raise the monetary base beyond the satiation level. We find that generally the central bank cannot credibly avoid a self-fulfilling debt crisis. Conventional policies needed to avert a crisis require excessive inflation for a sustained period of time. Unconventional monetary policy can only be effective when the economy is at a structural ZLB for a sustained length of time.
Introduction
A popular explanation for the sovereign debt crisis that has impacted European periphery countries since 2010 is self-ful…lling sentiments. If market participants believe that sovereign default of a country is more likely, they demand higher spreads, which over time raises the debt level and therefore indeed makes eventual default more likely. 1 This view of self-ful…lling beliefs is consistent with the evidence that the surge in sovereign bond spreads in Europe during 2010-2011 was disconnected from debt ratios and other macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., de Grauwe and Ji, 2013). However, countries with comparable debt and de…cits outside the Eurozone (e.g., the US, Japan or the UK) were not impacted. This difference in experience has often been attributed to the fact that the highly indebted non-Eurozone countries have their own currency. 2 The central bank has additional tools to support the …scal authority, either in the form of standard in ‡ation policy or by providing liquidity, which can avoid self-ful…lling debt crises. In fact, the decline in European spreads since mid 2012 is widely attributed to a change in ECB policy towards explicit backing of periphery government debt.
The question that we address in this paper is whether central banks can credibly avert self-ful…lling debt crises. This is a quantitative question that requires a reasonably realistic model. Existing models of self-ful…lling sovereign debt crises either take the form of liquidity or rollover crises, such as Cole and Kehoe (2000) , or models in the spirit of Calvo (1988) , where default becomes self-ful…lling by raising the spread on sovereign debt. 3 In this paper we are interested in the second type of self-ful…lling crises, which …ts more closely with the experience in 1 This view was held by the ECB President Draghi himself: "... the assessment of the Governing Council is that we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the euro area in what we call a "bad equilibrium", namely an equilibrium where you may have self-ful…lling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very adverse scenarios." (press conference, September 6, 2012) . In the academic literature, versions of this argument can be found, among others, in Aguiar (2013). 3 Navarro et al. (2014) show that this mechanism can also arise in sovereign debt models in the line of Eaton and Gersovitz (1988) .
Europe. However, while the contribution by Calvo was important in highlighting the mechanism, it uses a two-period setup that quantitatively is of limited interest. We therefore analyze the role that the central bank can play in the context of a framework developed by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014) , which extends the mechanism of Calvo (1988) to a more dynamic setting. The model exhibits "slow moving" debt crises. The anticipation of a possible future default on long term bonds leads interest rates and debt to gradually rise over time, justifying the belief of ultimate default. This framework has two advantages. First, while the mechanism is in the spirit of Calvo (1988) , the presence of long-term debt and more realistic dynamics provides a better framework for quantitatively evaluating the role of monetary policy. The slow-moving nature of the crisis also gives the central bank more time to act to support the …scal authority. Second, the model connects closely to the recent experience in Europe, where sovereign default spreads rose over several years without setting o¤ immediate default events.
While the LW model is real and does not have a monetary authority, we analyze the role of monetary policy by incorporating the LW framework into a standard New Keynesian model. We follow the literature and consider a speci…cation that yields empirically consistent responses of output and in ‡ation to monetary shocks. We then …rst analyze the role of conventional monetary policy. Expansionary policy that lowers interest rates, raises in ‡ation and raises output slows down government debt accumulation in four ways. First, lower real interest rates reduce the real cost of new borrowing. Second, in ‡ation erodes the value of outstanding debt. Third, higher output raises government tax revenue. Finally, an increase in the money supply generates seigniorage revenue.
Most of the paper considers the case, also analyzed in LW, where the decision to default or not takes place at a known future date T . At that time uncertainty about future …scal surpluses is resolved. At an initial date 0 a self-ful…lling expectation shock can lead to beliefs of default at time T . Investors then demand a higher yield on new debt, which leads to a more rapid accumulation of debt between the initial period 0 and the default period T . If debt is large enough, default may occur due to insolvency. There is a range of initial debt levels at time 0 for which self-ful…lling crises may occur. Monetary policy can be used to relax the solvency constraint both ex ante, before T , and ex post, after T . We also consider an extension in which there is uncertainty about T .
Su¢ ciently aggressive monetary policy can in principle preclude a self-ful…lling debt crisis. However, the policy needs to be credible and therefore not too costly, especially in terms of in ‡ation. Assuming reasonable parameters of the model and the debt maturity structure, we …nd that avoiding a crisis equilibrium is typically very costly. For example, with an initial debt level in the middle of the multiplicity range (112% of GDP), optimal policy that avoids a self-ful…lling crisis implies that prices ultimately increase by a factor of 5 and the peak annual in ‡ation rate is 24%. Avoiding self-ful…lling equilibria requires very steep in ‡ation rates for a sustained period of time, the cost of which is likely to be much larger than that of allowing the government to default. We …nd that this result is robust to signi…cant changes in the assumed parameters of both the LW and NK components of the model. We also consider unconventional monetary policy, where the monetary base is expanded beyond the satiation level of money demand. We consider both a liquidity support policy, whereby the consolidated government issues monetary liabilities instead of new debt, and a debt buyback policy, where existing government debt is replaced with monetary liabilities. An important advantage of such policies is that, in contrast to government debt, there is no payment of default premia on monetary liabilities. Nonetheless we …nd that such policies can only be e¤ective if the economy is at a structural zero lower bound (ZLB), where the natural real interest rate is zero or negative, for a sustained period of time.
We consider the case where a central bank aims to avoid default of the central government. As we brie ‡y discuss toward the end of the paper, our main result that a central bank can generally not credibly avoid a self-ful…lling debt crisis does not apply to the situation in Europe in the summer of 2012, when the ECB aimed to avoid default in a limited periphery of the currency union. The ECB could for example sell German bonds and buy Spanish bonds at low interest rates, without any monetary expansion. Just the threat alone of such a policy is su¢ cient to avoid the default equilibrium.
The impact of monetary policy in a self-ful…lling debt crisis environment was …rst analyzed by Calvo (1988) , who examined the trade-o¤ between outright default and debt de ‡ation. Corsetti and Dedola (2014) extend the Calvo model to allow for both fundamental and self-ful…lling default. They show that with optimal monetary policy debt crises can still happen, but for larger levels of debt. They also show that a crisis can be avoided if government debt is replaced by central bank debt that is convertible into cash. Reis (2013) and Jeanne (2012) both develop stylized two-period models with multiple equilibria to illustrate ways in which the central bank can act to avoid the bad equilibrium.
Some papers consider more dynamic models. Camous and Cooper (2014) use a dynamic overlapping-generation model with strategic default. They show that the central bank can avoid self-ful…lling default if they commit to a policy where in ‡ation depends on the state (productivity, interest rate, sunspot). Aguiar et al. (2013) consider a dynamic model to analyze the vulnerability to self-ful…lling rollover crises, depending on the aversion of the central bank to in ‡ation. Although a rollover crisis occurs suddenly, it is assumed that there is a grace period to repay the debt, allowing the central bank time to reduce the real value of the debt through in ‡ation. They …nd that only for intermediate levels of the cost of in ‡ation do debt crises occur under a narrower range of debt values.
All these papers derive analytical conditions under which central bank policy would avoid a self-ful…lling debt crisis. This delivers interesting insights, but does not answer the more quantitative question whether realistically the central bank can be expected to adopt a policy that prevents a self-ful…lling crisis. In order to do so we relax the assumptions of one-period bonds, ‡exible prices, and instantaneous crises that are adopted in the literature above for tractability reasons. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the slow-moving debt crisis model based on LW. It starts with a real version of the model and then presents its extension to a monetary environment. Subsequently, it analyzes the various channels of monetary policy in this framework. Section 3 describes the New Keynesian part of the model and its calibration. Section 4 analyzes the quantitative impact of conventional monetary policy and Section 5 considers unconventional monetary policy. After a discussion of related questions in Section 6, Section 7 concludes. Some of the technical details are left to the Appendix, while additional algebraic details and results can be found in a separate Technical Appendix. 4 There are recent models that examine the impact of monetary policy in the presence of longterm government bonds. Leeper and Zhou (2013) analyze optimal monetary (and …scal) policy with ‡exible prices, while Bhattarai et al. (2013) consider a New Keynesian environment at ZLB. These papers, however, do not allow for the possibility of sovereign default. Sheedy (2014) and Gomes et al. (2014) examine monetary policy with long-term private sector bonds.
A Model of Slow-Moving Self-Ful…lling Debt Crisis
In this section we present a dynamic sovereign debt crisis model based on LW. We …rst describe the basic structure of the model in a real environment. We then extend the model to a monetary environment and discuss the impact of monetary policy on the existence of self-ful…lling debt crises. We focus on the dynamics of asset prices and debt for given interest rates and goods prices. The latter will be determined in a New Keynesian model that we describe in Section 3.
A Real Model
We consider a simpli…ed version of the LW model. As in the applications considered by LW, there is a key date T at which uncertainty about future primary surpluses is resolved and the government makes a decision to default or not. 5 Default occurs at time T if the present value of future primary surpluses is insu¢ cient to repay the debt. We assume that default does not happen prior to date T as there is always a possibility of large primarily surpluses from T onward. In one version of their model LW assume that T is known to all agents, while in another they assume that it is unknown and arrives each period with a certain probability. We mostly adopt the former assumption. In section 4.3 we brie ‡y discuss an extension where T is uncertain. The only simpli…cation we adopt relative to LW concerns the process of the primary surplus. For now we assume that the primary surplus s t is constant at s between periods 0 and T 1. Below we extend this by allowing for a procyclical primary surplus. 6 A second assumption concerns the primary surplus value starting at date T . Lets denote the maximum potential primary surplus that the government is able to achieve, which becomes known at time T and is constant from thereon. LW assume that it is drawn from a log normal distribution. Instead we assume that it is drawn from a binary distribution, which simpli…es the algebra 5 One can for example think of countries that have been hit by a shock that adversely a¤ected their primary surpluses, which is followed by a period of uncertainty about whether and how much the government is able to restore primary surpluses through higher taxation or reduced spending. 6 LW assume a …scal rule whereby the surplus is a function of debt. and the presentation. It can take on only two values: s low with probability and s high with probability 1 . When the present discounted value ofs is at least as large as what the government owes on debt, there is no default at time T and the actual surplus is just su¢ cient to satisfy the budget constraint (generally below s). We assume that s high is big enough such that this is always the case wheñ s = s high . 7 Whens = s low and its present value is insu¢ cient to repay the debt, the government defaults. A key feature of the model is the presence of long-term debt. As usual in the literature, assume that bonds pay coupons (measured in goods) that depreciate at a rate of 1 over time: , (1 ) , (1 ) 2 , and so on. 8 A smaller therefore implies a longer maturity of debt. This facilitates aggregation as a bond issued at t s corresponds to (1 ) s bonds issued at time t. We can then de…ne all outstanding bonds in terms of the equivalent of newly issued bonds. We de…ne b t as debt measured in terms of the equivalent of newly issued bonds at t 1 on which the …rst coupon is due at time t. As in LW, we take as given. It is associated with tradeo¤s that are not explicitly modeled, and we do not allow the government to change the maturity to avoid default. Let Q t be the price of a government bond. At time t the value of government debt is Q t b t+1 . In the absence of default the return on the government bond from t to t + 1 is
If there is default at time T , bond holders are able to recover a proportion < 1 of the present discounted value s pdv of the primary surpluses s low . 9 In that case the return on the government bond is
Government debt evolves according to
7 See Technical Appendix for details. 8 See for example Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) . 9 One can think of as the outcome of a bargaining process between the government (representing taxpayers) and bondholders. Since governments rarely default on all their debt, we assume > 0.
In the absence of default this may also be written as
The initial stock of debt b 0 is given. We assume that investors also have access to a short-term bond with a gross real interest rate R t . The only shocks in the model occur at time 0 (self-ful…lling shock to expectations) and time T (value ofs). In other periods the following risk-free arbitrage condition holds (for t 0 and t 6 = T 1):
For now we assume, as in LW, a constant interest rate, R t = R. In that case s pdv = Rs low =(R 1) is the present discounted value of s low . There is no default at time T if s pdv covers current and future debt service at T , which is
Since there is no default after time T , Q T is the risk-free price, equal to the present discounted value of future coupons. For convenience it is assumed that = R 1 + , so that (4) implies that Q T = 1. This means that there is no default as long as s pdv Rb T , or if
When b T >b, the government partially defaults on debt, with investors seizing a fraction of the present value s pdv .
This framework may lead to multiple equilibria and to a slow-moving debt crisis, as described in LW. The existence of multiple equilibria can be seen graphically from the intersection of two schedules, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The …rst schedule, labeled "pricing schedule", is a consistency relationship between price and outstanding debt at T 1, in view of the default decision that may be taken at T . This is given by:
When b T b , the arbitrage condition (4) also applies to t = T 1, implying Q T 1 = 1. When b T is just aboveb, there is a discrete drop of the price because only a fraction of primary surpluses can be recovered by bond holders in case of default. For larger values of debt, Q T 1 will be even lower as the primary surpluses have to be shared among more bonds.
The second schedule is the "debt accumulation schedule", which expresses the amount of debt that accumulates through time T 1 as a function of prices between 0 and T 1. Since every price Q t between 0 and T 1 can be expressed as a function of Q T 1 , by integrating (4) backwards from T 1 to 0 we obtain
Substituting in (3) and integrating the government budget constraint forward from 0 to T 1, we get (see Appendix A):
where
The numerator b 0 s s in (9) corresponds to the accumulated new borrowing between 0 and T . We assume that it is positive, which happens when the primary surplus is insu¢ cient to pay the coupons on the initial debt. A su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition is that the primary surplus itself is negative during this time.
The debt accumulation schedule then gives a negative relationship between and b T and Q T 1 . When Q T 1 is lower, asset prices from 0 to T 2 are also lower. This implies a higher yield on newly issued debt, re ‡ecting a premium for possible default at time T . These default premia lead to a more rapid accumulation of debt and therefore a higher b T at T 1. Figure 1 shows these two schedules and illustrates the multiplicity of equilibria. There are two stable equilibria, represented by points A and B. At point A, Q T 1 = 1. The bond price is then equal to 1 at all times. This is the "good" equilibrium in which there is no default. At point B, Q T 1 < 1. This is the "bad" equilibrium. Asset prices starting at time 0 are less than 1 in anticipation of possible default at time T . Intuitively, when agents believe that default is likely, they demand default premia (implying lower asset prices), leading to a more rapid accumulation of debt, which in a self-ful…lling way indeed makes default more likely.
In the bad equilibrium there is a slow-moving debt crisis. As can be seen from (8), using Q T 1 < 1, the asset price instantaneously drops at time 0 and then continues to drop all the way to T 1. Correspondingly, default premia gradually rise over time. Such a slow-moving crisis occurs only for intermediate levels of debt. When b 0 is su¢ ciently low, the debt accumulation schedule is further to the left, crossing below point C, and only the good equilibrium exists. When b 0 is su¢ ciently high, the debt accumulation schedule is further to the right, crossing above point D, and only a bad equilibrium exists. In that case default is unavoidable whens = s low .
A Monetary Model
We now extend the model to a monetary economy. The goods price level is P t . R t is now the gross nominal interest rate and r t = R t P t =P t+1 the gross real interest rate. The central bank can set the interest rate R t and a¤ect P t . The coupons on government debt are now nominal. The number of bonds at time t 1 is B t and B 0 is given. We de…ne b t = B t =P t . The arbitrage equation with no default remains (4), while the government budget constraint for t 6 = T becomes
where s t is now the real primary surplus, s t P t the nominal surplus, and Z t is a nominal transfer from the central bank.
The central bank budget constraint is :
where B c t are government bonds held by the central bank and are its sole assets. The value of central bank assets decreases with the depreciation of government bonds and payments Z t to the treasury. It is increased by the coupon payments and an expansion M t M t 1 of monetary liabilities.
The balance sheets of the central bank and government are interconnected as most central banks pay a measure of net income (including seigniorage) to the Treasury as a dividend. 10 We will therefore consider the consolidated government budget constraint by substituting the central bank constraint into the government budget constraint:
t is government debt held by the general public. The consolidated government can reduce debt to the private sector by issuing monetary liabilities M t M t 1 .
Let e m represent accumulated seigniorage between 0 and T 1:
Similarly, let m pdv denote the present discounted value of seigniorage revenues starting at date T :
At time T the real obligation of the government to bond holders is
, with the latter now de…ned as
+ ::: s low (16) and Q T is equal to the present discounted value of coupons:
In analogy to the real model, the new pricing schedule becomes
Since m pdv can potentially be negative, in (19) the minimum return in the bad state is set at 0. The new pricing schedule implies a relationship between Q T 1 and b T that has the same shape as in the real model, but is now impacted by monetary policy through real and nominal interest rates, in ‡ation, and seigniorage. The debt accumulation schedule now becomes (see Appendix A):
where = r T 2 :::r 1 r 0 + (1 )r T 2 :::
The schedule again implies a negative relationship between Q T 1 and b T . Monetary policy shifts the schedule through its impact on interest rates, in ‡ation, and seigniorage.
The Impact of Monetary Policy
Conventional monetary policy a¤ects the paths of interest rates, prices, output and seigniorage, which in turn shifts the two schedules and therefore can a¤ect the existence of self-ful…lling debt crises. The idea is to implement a monetary policy strategy conditional on expectations of sovereign default, which only happens in the crisis equilibrium. If this strategy is successful and credible, the crisis equilibrium is avoided altogether and the policy does not need to be implemented. It is therefore the threat of such a policy that may preclude the crisis equilibrium.
In terms of Figure 1 , the crisis equilibrium is avoided when the debt accumulation schedule goes through point C or below. This is the case when
(21) Note that point C itself is not on the price schedule as its lower section starts for b t >b. It is therefore su¢ cient that this condition holds as an equality, which corresponds to point C. The central bank can impact this condition through both ex ante policies, taking place between 0 and T 1, and ex post policies, taking place in period T and afterwards. Ex-ante policies have the e¤ect of shifting the debt accumulation schedule down, while ex-post policies shift the pricing schedule to the right.
Conventional monetary policy can a¤ect the existence of a default equilibrium through in ‡ation, real interest rates, seigniorage and output. In ‡ation reduces the real value of nominal coupons on the debt outstanding at time 0. Ex-ante policy in the form of in ‡ation prior to time T reduces the real value of coupon payments both before and after T . This is captured respectively through in the numerator of (21) and the term B 0 =P T in the denominator in (21) . In ‡ation after time T only reduces the real value of coupons after T , which is re ‡ected in a lower value of Q T in the denominator.
Reducing real interest rates lowers the cost of new borrowing. For ex-ante policy this is captured through both and s in the numerator of (21), which represents the accumulated new borrowing from 0 to T . For ex-post policy it shows up through a rise in s pdv in the denominator of (21). 11 Expansionary monetary policy can also lead to a rise in seigniorage. Seigniorage prior to time T reduces the numerator of the left hand side of (21), while seigniorage after time T raises the denominator. Finally, we will also consider an extension where monetary policy can have a favorable e¤ect through output. If we allow the primary surplus to be pro-cyclical, expansionary monetary policy that raises output will raise primary surpluses. Beyond these implications of conventional monetary policy, we will also consider unconventional monetary policy whereby the money supply is expanded beyond the satiation level, which happens at the zero lower bound. Since the impact of such policies is not immediately transparent from (21), we will postpone a discussion until Section 5.
A Basic New Keynesian Model
We consider a standard New Keynesian model based on Galí (2008, ch. 3), with three extensions suggested by Woodford (2003) : i) habit formation; ii) price indexation; iii) lagged response in price adjustment. These extensions are standard in the monetary DSGE literature and are introduced to generate more realistic responses to monetary shocks. The main e¤ect of these extensions is to generate a delayed impact of a monetary policy shock on output and in ‡ation, leading to the humped-shaped response seen in the data.
Households
With habit formation, households maximize
where total consumption C t is (23) and N t is labor and z is a default cost. We have t = 0 if there is no default at time t and t = 1 if there is default. The default cost does not a¤ect households' decisions, but provides an incentive for authorities to avoid default. Habit persistence, measured by , is a common feature in NK models to generate a delayed response of expenditure and output.
The budget constraint is
Here D t+1 are holdings of one-period bonds that are in zero net supply. P t is the standard aggregate price level and W t is the wage level. t are …rms pro…ts distributed to households and T t are lump-sum taxes. We will abstract from government consumption, so that the primary surplus is
is a transaction cost, where Y n t = P t Y t is nominal GDP and @f =@M 0. The …rst-order conditions with respect to D t+1 and B p t+1 are
The combination of (25) and (26) gives the arbitrage equations (4), (18) , and (19) . This is because government default, which lowers the return on government bonds, does not a¤ect consumption due to Ricardian equivalence. 12 Let Y t denote real output and c t , y t and y n t denote logs of consumption, output and the natural rate of output. Using c t = y t , and de…ning x t = y t y n t as the output gap, log-linearization of the Euler equation (25) gives the dynamic IS equationx
Here i t = ln(R t ) will be referred to as the nominal interest rate and r n = ln( ) is the natural rate of interest. The latter uses our assumption below of constant productivity, which implies a constant natural rate of output.
Firms
There is a continuum of …rms on the interval [0; 1], producing di¤erentiated goods. The production function of …rm i is
We follow Woodford (2003) by assuming …rm-speci…c labor. Calvo price setting is assumed, with a fraction 1 of …rms re-optimizing their price each period. In addition, it is assumed that re-optimization at time t is based on information from date t d. This feature, adopted by Woodford (2003) , is in the spirit of the model of information delays of Mankiw and Reis (2001) . It has the e¤ect of a delayed impact of a monetary policy shock on in ‡ation, consistent with the data. 13 Analogous to Christiano et al. (2005) , Smets and Wouters (2003) and many others, we also adopt an in ‡ation indexation feature in order to generate more persistence of in ‡ation. Firms that do not re-optimize follow the simple indexation rule
12 When substituting the consolidated government budget constraint
T t into the household budget constraint (24) , and imposing asset market equilibrium, we get C t = Y t , which is real GDP and una¤ected by default. Here we assume that the transaction cost f (M t ; Y n t ) is paid to intermediaries that do not require real resources and return their pro…ts to households. It is therefore included in t . 13 This feature can also be justi…ed in terms of a delay by which newly chosen prices go into e¤ect.
where t 1 = ln P t 1 ln P t 2 is aggregate in ‡ation one period ago. Leaving the algebra to the Technical Appendix, these features give the following Phillips curve (after linearization):
Money Demand
Most of the conventional monetary policy results we report are for a cashless economy. But to consider the additional role of seigniorage we use a convenient form of the transaction cost that gives rise to a standard speci…cation for money demand when i t > 0 (m t = ln(M t )) 14 :
When i t is close to zero, money demand reaches the satiation level m + p t + y t . Under conventional monetary policy we assume that money supply does not go beyond the satiation level, so that there is a direct correspondence between the chosen interest rates and money supply.
Monetary Policy
We follow most of the literature by using a quadratic approximation of utility. Conditional on avoiding the default equilibrium, the central bank then minimizes the following objective function: where , x and a function of model parameters (see the Technical Appendix for the derivation). The central bank chooses the optimal path of nominal interest rates over H > T periods. After that, we assume an interest rate rule as in Clarida et al. (1999) :
where { = ln( ) is the steady state nominal interest rate. We will choose H to be large. Interest rates between time T and H involve ex-post-policy. 15 Optimal policy is chosen conditional on two types of constraints. The …rst is the ZLB constraint that i t 0 for all periods. In the good equilibrium that is the only constraint and the optimal policy implies i t = { each period, delivering zero in ‡ation and a zero output gap. However, conditional on expectations of default that raise default premia, the central bank will engage in expansionary policy that is just su¢ cient to avoid the self-ful…lling bad equilibrium, so that (21) is satis…ed as an equality. Graphically, this means that the debt accumulation schedule goes through point C in Figure 1 .
Using the NK Phillips curve (31), the dynamic IS equation (27) , and the policy rule (34) after time H, we solve for the path of in ‡ation and output gap conditional on the set of H interest rates chosen. We then minimize the welfare cost (33) over the H interest rates subject to i t 0 and (21) as an equality.
Calibration
We consider one period to be a quarter and normalize the constant productivity A such that the natural rate of output is equal to 1 annually (0.25 per quarter). The other parameters are listed in Table 1 . The left panel shows the parameters from the LW model, while the right panel lists the parameters that pertain to the New Keynesian part of the model.
Consider …rst the LW parameters. We set = 0:99, implying a 4% annualized interest rate. A key parameter, which we will see has an impact on the results, is . In the benchmark parameterization we set it equal to 0.05, which implies a government debt duration of 4.2 years. This is typical in the data. For example, OECD estimates of the Macauley duration in 2010 are 4.0 in the US and 4.4 for the average of the …ve European countries that experienced a sovereign debt crisis 15 Since H will be large, the precise policy rule after H does not have much e¤ect on the results.
(Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland). The coupon is determined such that = 1= 1 + . The other parameters, T and the …scal surplus parameters, do not have a direct empirical counterpart, but are chosen so that there is a broad range of self-ful…lling equilibria. If the range of initial debt B 0 for which multiple equilibria are feasible is very narrow, the entire problem would be a non-issue.
The
Under the parameters in Table 1 this range is [0:79; 1:46]. This means that debt is between 79% and 146% of GDP. This is not unlike debt of the European periphery hit by the 2010 crisis, where debt ranged from 62% in Spain to 148% in Greece.
Note that the assumption s = 0:01, corresponding to a 4% annual primary de…cit, also corresponds closely to Europe, where the …ve periphery crisis countries had an average primary de…cit of 4.4% in 2010. We set T = 20 for the benchmark, corresponding to 5 years. We will see in section 4.2 that there are other parameter choices that lead to the same values of B low and B high without much e¤ect on results.
The New Keynesian parameters are standard in the literature. The …rst 5 parameters correspond exactly to those in Gali (2008) . The habit formation parameter, the indexation parameter and the parameters in the interest rate rule are all the same as in Christiano et al. (2005) . We take d = 2 from Woodford (2003, p. 218-219), which also corresponds closely to Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . This set of parameters implies a response to a small monetary policy shock under the Taylor rule that is similar to the empirical VAR results reported by Christiano et al. (2005) . The level of output and in ‡ation at their peak correspond exactly to that in the data. Both the output and in ‡ation response is humped shaped like the data, although the peak response (quarter 6 and 3 respectively for in ‡ation and output) occurs a bit earlier than in the data. We discuss the two money demand parameters in section 4.3, where we consider the role of seigniorage.
Can Monetary Policy Credibly Avoid a Debt
Crisis?
The optimal monetary policy that we have described is credible as long as the welfare cost associated with in ‡ation and non-zero output gaps is less than the cost of default. In reporting the results, we will mainly focus on the in ‡ation cost. We do so for two reasons. First, the cost of default is hard to measure, including reputational costs, trade exclusion costs, costs through the …nancial system and political costs. In addition, even within our model the cost of in ‡ation is very sensitive to parameters that otherwise have very little e¤ect on optimal in ‡ation. Second, we will see that the key message that an excessive amount of in ‡ation is needed avoid a self-ful…lling default, is very robust and not a¤ected by parameter assumptions that signi…cantly a¤ect the welfare cost in the model. 17 We will …rst consider optimal monetary policy in a cashless economy where we abstract from seigniorage. After considering the benchmark parametrization, we show that the results are robust to signi…cant changes in parameters. We …nally consider seigniorage and extensions with a pro-cyclical …scal surplus and uncertainty about T , none of which change the …ndings. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of in ‡ation under optimal policy under the benchmark parameterization for H = 40 (which we assume throughout). The results are shown for various levels of B 0 . The optimal path for in ‡ation is hump shaped. Optimal in ‡ation gradually rises, both due to rigidities and because the welfare cost (33) depends on the change in in ‡ation. Eventually optimal in ‡ation decreases as it becomes less e¤ective over time when the original debt depreciates and is replaced by new debt that incorporates in ‡ation expectations. When B 0 = B middle = 1:12, which is exactly in the middle of range of debt levels giving rise to multiple 17 At a deeper level, a problem is that there is no consensus on what the exact welfare costs of in ‡ation and output gap are. In ‡ation costs depend signi…cantly on the type of price setting (see Ambler (2007) for a discussion of Taylor pricing versus Calvo pricing). In ‡ation costs are also broader than the ine¢ ciencies associated with relative price changes that in ‡ation induces. In the model the in ‡ation cost would be zero if all …rms raised prices simultaneously. It is also well known that the representative agent nature of the model understates the welfare costs of non-zero output gaps. equilibria, the maximum in ‡ation rate reaches 23.8%. In ‡ation is over 20% for 4 years, over 10% for 8 years and the price level ultimately increases by a factor 5.3.
Results under Benchmark Parameterization
Such high in ‡ation is implausible. In ‡ation needed to avoid default gets even much higher for higher debt levels. When B 0 reaches the upper bound B high for multiple equilibria, the maximum in ‡ation rate is close to 47% and ultimately the price level increases by a factor 25! Only when B 0 is very close to the lower bound for multiplicity, as illustrated for B 0 = 0:8, is little in ‡ation needed.
In order to understand why so much in ‡ation is needed, …rst consider a rather extreme experiment where all of the increase in prices happens right away in the …rst quarter. This cannot happen in the NK model, so assume that prices are perfectly ‡exible, the real interest rate is constant at 1= and the output gap remains zero. When B 0 = B middle = 1:12, the price level would need to rise by 42%. This is needed to lower debt so that we are no longer in the region where multiple equilibria are possible. Of course such a policy, even if possible, is not plausible either as it would involve an annualized in ‡ation rate for that quarter of 168%.
In reality in ‡ation will be spread out over a period of time, both because sticky prices imply a gradual change in prices and because it is optimal from a welfare perspective not to have the increase in the price level happen all at once. However, such a delay increases the ultimate increase in the price level that is needed. As the time zero debt depreciates (is repaid), in ‡ation quickly becomes less e¤ective as it only helps to reduce the real value of coupons on the original time zero debt. More in ‡ation is then needed to avoid the default equilibrium.
In ‡ation may be limited to the extent that lower real interest rates, by lowering the costs of borrowing, help to avoid the default equilibrium. But the bene…t from lower real interest rates turns out to be limited. Under the benchmark parameterization the real interest rate goes to zero for two quarters, since we reach the ZLB and in ‡ation is initially zero, but after that it soon goes back to its steady state. In order to understand why this result is more general than the speci…c parameterization here, consider the consumption Euler equation, which in linearized form implies (27) . It is well known that without habit formation ( = 0) this can be solved as
This precludes a large and sustained drop in the real interest rate as it would imply an enormous and unrealistic immediate change in output at time zero, especially with = 1 as often assumed. For the benchmark parameterization, where = 1 and = 0:65, we derive an analogous expression in the Technical Appendix. Removing the expectation operator and the r n for convenience, we have x 0 = 0:58r 0 0:73r 1 0:83r 2 0:89r 3 0:93r 4 0:95r 5 0:97r 6 0:98r 7 0:99r 8 ::: (38) Subsequent coe¢ cients are very close to -1. For the path of real interest rates under optimal policy this implies x 0 = 0:0157. This translates into an immediate increase in output of 6.3% on an annualized basis, which is already pushing the boundaries of what is plausible.
Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider changes to both the LW and NK parameters. An issue arises when changing the LW parameters as they a¤ect the region [B low ; B high ] for B 0 under which multiple equilibria arise. For example, when T = 10, there is less time for a debt crisis to develop and a higher level of initial debt is needed to have a self-ful…lling crisis. Naturally the question that we address here has little content when this region [B low ; B high ] is very narrow. This issue does not arise for the NK parameters, which leave this region unchanged.
We should …rst point out that the same region [B low ; B high ] under which there are multiple equilibria under the benchmark parameterization applies to many other reasonable combinations of LW parameters. The left panel of Figure 3 shows combinations of T , s and s low that generate the same B low and B high . The panel on the right shows that this has little e¤ect on the path of optimal in ‡ation. Varying T from 10 to 30, while adjusting s and s low to keep B low and B high unchanged, gives very similar paths for optimal in ‡ation.
In Figure 4 and Table 2 we present results when varying one parameter at a time, but keeping B 0 =B low the same as under the benchmark parameterization. Table 2 shows that B low and B high can be signi…cantly a¤ected by the LW parameters. But the results control for this by keeping B 0 =B low = 1:42 as under the benchmark. For the LW parameters this implies values of B 0 that can be relatively closer to B low or B high , dependent on their values for that parameter. 18 Only for = 0:7 is B 0 now slightly above B high . For all other parameters the B 0 is within Each panel of Figure 4 reports optimal in ‡ation for two values of a parameter, one higher and the other lower than in the benchmark. The last two columns of Table 2 report the price level after in ‡ation and the maximum level of in ‡ation. Figure 4 shows that for most parameters the optimal in ‡ation path is remarkably little a¤ected by the level of parameters. For example, optimal in ‡ation is only slightly higher for T = 10 than T = 30. When T is low, ex-post policies will be much more important than for higher values of T , but the overall impact on in ‡ation is similar. Also notice that setting the probability of the bad state equal to 1 has little e¤ect on the results.
There are three parameters, , and d, for which there are more signi…cant di¤erences. A lower debt depreciation , which implies a longer maturity of debt, implies lower in ‡ation. The reason is that in ‡ation is e¤ective for a longer period of time as the time 0 debt depreciates more slowly. But even when = 0:025, so that the duration is 7.2 years, optimal in ‡ation is still above 10% for 6.5 years and the price level ultimately triples. A lower value for the lag in price adjustment, d, also allows for a lower in ‡ation rate. With d = 0 it is possible to increase in ‡ation from the start, when debt de ‡ation is the most powerful. But even with d = 0, optimal in ‡ation still peaks close to 20% and the price level still more than quadruples as a result of years of in ‡ation. No matter what the parameter values, an implausibly high level of in ‡ation is needed to avert a self-ful…lling debt crisis.
Finally, we also see a clear di¤erence when we lower the in ‡ation indexation parameter . Lower indexation reduces in ‡ation persistence. But more importantly, it directly a¤ects optimal policy through (33) . With = 1, only changes in in ‡ation matter, while with < 1 the level of in ‡ation is also undesirable. To avoid higher in ‡ation levels, the central bank takes advantage of the real interest rate channel to avoid the bad equilibrium. But the sharp drop in the real interest rate leads to an unrealistic output response: with = 0:9, output increases at an annual rate of 24% in the …rst quarter. The same happens when we set = d = = 0 as in the Gali (2008) textbook model. In that case in ‡ation starts at 23% APR in the …rst quarter, but the ultimate increase in the price level is now much less, only 66%. In ‡ation, while still substantial, is again limited in this case because of a sharp drop in real interest rates. There is now an incredulous 25% increase in output in the …rst quarter, which is a 100% annualized growth rate.
the interval for B 0 generating multiple equilibria.
Introducing additional features that limit such unrealistic changes in the level of output would again generate signi…cantly higher in ‡ation rates.
A couple of comments are in order about welfare versus in ‡ation. As already pointed out, the welfare cost is very sensitive to NK parameters even when in ‡ation is little a¤ected. For example, the benchmark case gives a welfare cost of 2.8%, measured as a one year percentage drop in consumption or output that generates the same drop in welfare. This seems quite small. But when we increase from 0.66 to 0.8, the welfare cost more than triples to 8.7, with very little di¤erence in optimal in ‡ation. If we adopt the textbook Gali model, where = d = = 0, the welfare cost is a staggering 85% and would be even much larger if we restricted the massive increase in output in the …rst quarter.
The welfare criterion depends signi…cantly on the speci…c model that maps the chosen interest rates into in ‡ation and output. But even if we substantially changed the NK model (beyond changes in parameters), the government is still trying to satisfy the no default constraint. The key message is that this constraint cannot be satis…ed for a remotely credible path of in ‡ation and plausible path of output.
Seigniorage and Other Extensions
We now discuss how the results are a¤ected when we introduce seigniorage, a pro-cyclical primary surplus and uncertainty about T . So far we have assumed a cashless economy. In order to consider seigniorage, we need to make an assumption about the semi-elasticity i of money demand. Seigniorage revenue is larger for lower values of i as that leads to a smaller drop in real money demand when in ‡ation rises. Estimates of i vary a lot, from as low as 6 in Ireland (2009) to as high as 60 in Bilson (1978) . 19 The biggest e¤ect from seigniorage therefore comes from the lowest value i = 6. But even in that case the e¤ect is limited. When B 0 = B middle , the maximum in ‡ation rate is reduced from 23.8% to 19.9% and the price level ultimately increases by a factor 4.1 instead of 5.3. 20 Here we have 19 Lucas (2000) …nds a value of 28 when translated to a quarterly frequency. Engel and West (2005) review many estimates that also fall in this range. 20 We calibrate m to the U.S., such that the satiation level of money corresponds to the monetary base just prior to its sharp rise in the Fall of 2008 when interest rates approached the ZLB. At that time the velocity of the monetary base was 17. This gives m = 1:45. The velocity is 4P t Y t =M t as output needs to be annualized, which is equal to 4e m at the satiation assumed that the money supply cannot go beyond the satiation level, a case we consider in the next section with unconventional monetary policy. There is clearly some bene…t from conventional seigniorage, but quantitatively it is small and does not change our conclusion that an excessive amount of in ‡ation is needed to avoid the crisis equilibrium. This result is consistent with Reis (2013) and Hilscher et al. (2014) . As Reis (2013) puts it, "In spite of the mystique behind the central bank's balance sheet, its resource constraint bounds the dividends it can distribute by the present value of seigniorage, which is a modest share of GDP". Nominal rigidities also give the central bank control over the accumulation of debt through the level of output that a¤ects the primary surplus. So far we have abstracted from this channel, but we now introduce a pro-cyclical primary surplus. From 0 through T 1 we have
where y is steady-state output. We similarly assume that s low is pro-cyclical: s low = s low + (y t y). We set the value of the cyclical parameter of the …scal surplus to = 0:1, in line with empirical estimates. 21 With this additional e¤ect from an output increase, the required in ‡ation decreases slightly. For B 0 = B middle , the maximum in ‡ation rate is reduced from 23.8% in the benchmark to 19.9%. The increase in the price level after in ‡ation is reduced from 5.3 under the benchmark to 4.0, which remains excessive. Optimal policy now gives more emphasis to raising output, leading to a …rst quarter increase that is 10% APR, pushing the boundary of what is plausible.
In the Technical Appendix we discuss one …nal extension, uncertainty about the date T of the default decision. This signi…cantly complicates the model and we only consider two possible values, T 1 and T 2 , which occur with probabilities p and 1 p. The key results remain the same. As one might expect, the range for B 0 over which there are multiple equilibria is now in between that for the cases where T = T 1 and T = T 2 without uncertainty. Monetary policy after T 1 is now contingent on whether there was a default decision at T 1 or not. The key conclusion that an excessive amount of in ‡ation is needed to avoid default (at both T 1 and T 2 ) remains unaltered.
level. 21 Note that since Y = 0:25 for quarterly GDP, the speci…cation implies that s = 0:4 Y .
Unconventional Monetary Policy
In this section we consider what the central bank can achieve through a signi…cant increase in money supply beyond the satiation level. We will argue that this is only helpful in averting a self-ful…lling crisis if the economy is at a structural ZLB, where the natural real interest rate is zero, for a long time.
Seigniorage
It is …rst useful to point out that expanding the money supply beyond the satiation level does not provide any support to the government through seigniorage. The present discounted value of seigniorage is
An increase in the money supply beyond the satiation level has no e¤ect on interest rates, which are already zero, and on prices. Money balances expand, but they are multiplied by a zero nominal interest rate R t 1 at the ZLB. The present discounted value of seigniorage is therefore una¤ected. One can think of seigniorage in two ways. One is the real value of the changes in monetary liabilities. In that context, any expansion of money beyond the satiation level will eventually be unwound as the economy will not be at the ZLB forever. Positive seigniorage is therefore eventually o¤set later by negative seigniorage. Alternatively, seigniorage can be thought of as the saving to the government from not having to pay interest on monetary liabilities. But this saving is zero when the nominal interest rate is 0.
Liquidity Support and Buyback Policies
We consider two speci…c policies that both reduce government debt held by the private sector and therefore default premia that the government pays on its debt. It is these default premia that are at the heart of the self-ful…lling crisis. The …rst is a liquidity support policy whereby the central bank provides the government with liquidity equal to B t s t P t from time 0 throughT 1. This quantity corresponds to the new debt issued each period. Under the liquidity support policy, the government avoids paying default premia on new debt in the bad equilibrium. This policy implies that the consolidated government issues new monetary liabilities of B t s t P t in period t.
The increase in money supply following from this policy goes well beyond the satiation level. 22 When the debt to GDP ratio is 1, it implies a seigniorage of 28%
per year under the benchmark. We will therefore be at the ZLB as long as this policy is in place. However, as long as the natural real interest rate is positive, or at least not zero forever, an expansion of money beyond the satiation level will be impossible to maintain. We assume that at timeT , the end of the policy, the expansion of monetary liabilities is replaced by new debt. The second policy is a "buyback policy,"whereby the consolidated government (i) buys back government bonds in exchange for monetary liabilities prior to time T and (ii) reverses this at timeT by replacing the increase in monetary liabilities with new debt. For simplicity we will assume that the buyback happens all at once, although this is not important.
Policy under Structural Zero Lower Bound
It is instructive to …rst consider the case where we are at a structural ZLB, so that the natural real interest rate is zero or below, while the policies discussed above are implemented. To illustrate this, assume that = 1 through period T , after which is a constant less than 1.
In this case, assuming T T , the default equilibrium can be avoided through the liquidity support policy we described when this policy lasts through time T 1 (T = T ). A formal proof of this is provided in Appendix B. The policy has no cost as we are already at the ZLB before the policy is implemented, and therefore prices and output are una¤ected. The default equilibrium is avoided because the government does not need to pay default premia from time 0 until time T . Instead of issuing new debt on which default premia are paid, it now issues monetary liabilities.
However, when T < T the monetary expansion beyond the satiation level needs to be reversed prior to time T if we wish to avoid the costs associated with changes in prices and output gap. WithT < T under either the liquidity support or buyback policies, default is not averted as seigniorage is not a¤ected. m pdv is unchanged as the policy occurs prior to time T andm can be written as
m does not change as any money balances that are beyond the satiation level are multiplied by zero (R t = 1) and M T 1 does not change (the money expansion is reversed prior to time T ). Since neither the pricing nor the debt accumulation schedules are a¤ected in that case, the same default equilibrium exists as before. The intuition behind this result is as follows. On the one hand, the government does not need to pay default premia on monetary liabilities. On the other hand, there is an exactly o¤setting loss that is a result of a gradual decline in the price of government bonds in the default equilibrium. Under the buyback policy, the government would therefore buy back its debt at a price higher than the price at which it later sells new debt (prior to time T ). Under the liquidity support policy, the government sells new debt prior to time T to replace its expanded money supply. The debt is sold at a lower price than the government would have received if it had sold new debt earlier instead of issuing monetary liabilities.
Policy Outside a Structural ZLB
Now assume that the economy is not at a structural ZLB. Therefore assume that < 1 is a constant as before and the natural real interest rate r n = ln( ) is positive. It is easy to see that neither the liquidity support nor buyback policies are e¤ective if in place only through timeT < T 1. We can think of these policies in two steps. The …rst step involves expanding the money supply to the satiation level. The second step involves a further expansion of money beyond the satiation level. The latter has no e¤ect for the same reason that it has no e¤ect under a structural ZLB. The …rst step also cannot credibly avoid a default as it can be no better than the optimal policy considered in section 4.3 when the money supply was restricted to be no larger than the satiation level.
ForT T 1 as well, neither of the two policies can credibly avoid the default equilibrium. First consider a liquidity support policy that lasts through time T 1. As already discussed, the required increase in monetary liabilities is well beyond the satiation level from the very start. The nominal interest rate is then lowered to 0 from period 0 to at least T 1. We argue that this is either impossible or excessively costly by generating substantial de ‡ation and a steep recession.
To see this, using the consumption Euler equation without habit formation for illustration, and setting the nominal interest rate at 0 for the …rst T periods, we have
With a 4% natural rate (benchmark parameterization), = 1 and T = 20, the right hand side is -20%. (42) then implies either a sharp drop in output or steep de ‡ation. In general there will be a combination of the two. 23 It is implausible that a central bank would wish to engineer a deep recession on purpose in order to avoid a government default.
24
It is also hard to see how a buyback policy that ends at time T or later could be e¤ectively implemented when the natural real interest rate is positive. Appendix B shows that at the structural ZLB such a policy would avoid the default equilibrium without any costs. There are two problems with this policy though. The …rst problem is associated with time consistency and applies whether we are at the structural ZLB or not. This occurs when the debt buyback happens su¢ ciently close to time T , for example at T 1. In that case the government is already insolvent in the bad equilibrium. 25 The only hope for the government to avoid default would be to buy back debt at the depressed low-equilibrium price and sell it again at T at the high risk-free price. But if the capital gain arising from this policy could succeed in avoiding default, the price at the buyback time would already be at its risk-free level, so default could not be avoided. Thus, the government has no incentive to follow through its promise to buy at T 1. Since investors are aware of this, the bad equilibrium can arise at t = 0. If instead the debt buyback happens closer to time 0, when the government 23 The output drop is larger with stronger downward nominal rigidities. Particularly wages are rigid downward, an aspect that is not captured in the model. Daly and Hobijn (2014) show that downward nominal wage rigidities bend the Phillips curve. During recessions, when the rigidities become more binding, they …nd that the labor market adjusts more through the unemployment margin than through wages. 24 Moreover, it is not even guaranteed that this policy would succeed in achieving its objective.
While the government will not need to pay default premia on new debt, de ‡ation increases the real coupons on the original debt from period 0, while a recession can signi…cantly lower tax revenues. 25 LW show that the government becomes insolvent sometime between date 0 and T as the debt accumulates due to default premia.
is not yet insolvent, this problem would not arise. But, as already discussed in the context of the liquidity support policy, it would require lowering the nominal interest rate to 0 for a substantial period of time, which creates de ‡ation and a deep recession.
Discussion
Here we brie ‡y discuss three related questions. The …rst one is a proposal by Corsetti and Dedola (2014) that the central bank issue risk-free liabilities that are convertible into cash. Second, we ask why many highly indebted non-Eurozone countries with their own currencies have escaped such crises recently if our conclusion is correct that the central bank cannot play much of a role. Finally, we ask why a change in ECB policy in the summer of 2012 was successful in lowering sovereign debt spreads, which seemingly goes against our message that there is little that central banks can do. Under the Corsetti-Dedola proposal government liabilities are replaced by central bank liabilities. When consolidating the accounts of the central government and central bank, there is in principle little di¤erence between debt issued by the government and the central bank. Nothing stops investors from demanding a default premium on non-monetary liabilities of the central bank. Convertibility into cash is not credible for the same reasons we discussed that simply replacing government debt with monetary liabilities does not help.
With regards to the second question, why countries with their own central banks seem to have escaped sovereign debt crises recently, there are many possible answers. The answer may partly be that since the end of 2008 many countries have been at a structural ZLB, which is the only case we identi…ed where central bank policy may be e¤ective. But the answer can also be that these countries are less exposed to self-ful…lling debt crises even with passive monetary policy when the market believes that their governments are more likely to make signi…cant …scal adjustments when needed. Other parameters of the model, such as higher expected recovery rates, may play a role as well. Even if there are multiple equilibria, at any point in time there may not be a trigger leading investors to coordinate on the bad equilibrium. The bottom line here is that there are many explanations that have nothing to do with whether these countries have their own currency.
Regarding the last question, the analysis in this paper applies to a central bank that aims to avoid a self-ful…lling default by the central government. The situation where the central bank of a currency union aims to avoid sovereign default in periphery countries of the union is quite di¤erent. Speci…cally, the ECB could buy government bonds of the periphery countries that experience high default premia and sell government bonds of countries that are not subject to a sovereign debt crisis. No monetary liabilities need to be issued in the process, generating no in ‡ation.
The ECB could keep interest rates on new debt of the periphery governments equal to their no-default levels and buy all new bonds that would otherwise be sold to the private sector at that low interest rate. The threat alone of doing so is su¢ cient, which is exactly what happened under the OMT policy in the summer of 2012 and the famous Draghi statement "to do whatever it takes". Such a threat was credible as such an intervention would not overwhelm the ECB. 26 This explains why sovereign spreads quickly fell due to the change in policy. But such a policy applies to a periphery and is of no help if a central bank aims to avoid a self-ful…lling sovereign debt crisis associated with its central government. Analogously, it would not work if the ECB aimed to avoid a self-ful…lling sovereign debt crisis across the entire Eurozone.
Conclusion
Several recent contributions have derived analytical conditions under which the central bank can avoid a self-ful…lling sovereign debt crisis. Extreme central bank intervention, generating extraordinary in ‡ation, would surely avoid a sovereign debt crisis. But the cost would be excessive, making such actions not credible. The aim of this paper has been to quantify this cost in order to better assess whether countries with their own currency (and therefore central bank) are less likely to be subject to such self-ful…lling debt crises.
To address this question, we have adopted a dynamic model with many realistic elements that make a quantitative assessment more meaningful. We introduced a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities in which monetary policy has realistic e¤ects on output and in ‡ation. We introduced long-term bonds and calibrated the maturity to what is observed in many industrialized countries. We allowed for slow-moving debt crises that are a good representation of the recent European sovereign debt crisis. We have considered both conventional monetary policy that impacts in ‡ation, real interest rates and output, and unconventional monetary policy that leads to a large expansion of the monetary base.
Overall our conclusion is that the ability to avert self-ful…lling crises is limited. Unless debt is close to the bottom of an interval where multiple equilibria occur, conventional policies involve very high in ‡ation for a sustained period of time. Unconventional monetary policy is only useful when the economy is at the structural ZLB for a sustained length of time.
Several extensions are worthwhile considering for future work. We have focused on a closed economy. In an open economy monetary policy also a¤ects the exchange rate, which a¤ects relative prices and output. While we made some brief comments at the end, it would also be of interest to more explicitly consider a monetary union, where sovereign default may be limited to only a segment of the union. Finally, we have only considered one type of self-ful…lling debt crises, associated with the interaction between sovereign spreads and debt. It would be of interest to also consider rollover crises or even a combination of both types of crises. This also provides an opportunity to consider the optimal maturity of sovereign debt, which we have taken as given.
A. Derivation of the Debt Accumulation Schedule.
We derive the debt accumulation schedule in the general case of Section 2.4. The debt accumulation schedule in the cashless economy (Section 2.2) is a special case of this where M t = 0 at all times. We …rst derive a relationship between Q 0 and Q T 1 . Integrating forward the one-period arbitrage equation (4) from t = 1 to t = T 1, we have:
Next consider the consolidated budget constraint (12):
The government budget constraint at t = 0 is:
Using equations (48) and (47) and integrating forward, we obtain
Combining equation (49) with (47) and (43), we obtain:
s(1 + r T 2 + r T 2 r T 3 + ::: + r T 2 :::r 1 r 0 ) r 0 :::r T 2 v 0 P 0 + r 1 :::r T 2 v 1 P 1 + :::
Using equations (43)-(45), we can rewrite equation (50) as
Using the expression for v t , the last term in brackets is equal tom as de…ned in (13) . This yields (20) .
B. Avoiding Self-ful…lling Default at a Structural ZLB
Assume that the discount rate is 1 for t = 0; ::; T with T T 1 and it is a constant < 1 for t > T . Under this assumption the central bank can keep the interest rate zero through time T , and raise it to 1= after time T , while keeping in ‡ation and the output gap at zero all along. So we have R t = 1 for t = 0; ::; T and R t = 1= for t > T . The price level is always 1. We then have
Using (41) we havem = M T 1 M 1 . Let M be the level of money demand starting at T +1, when we are no longer at the ZLB. Then m pdv = M M T 1 . De…ne M = M T 1 M 1 and dm = M M 1 . Thenm = M and m pdv = dm M . Assuming that we are already at the ZLB at time -1, dm is negative.
Using the results from section 2.4, the pricing schedule is then
where h( M ) = 0 if s pdv + dm M 0 and otherwise h( M ) =
The debt accumulation schedule is T s conditional on a sunspot shock. We will show that this is a su¢ cient condition to avoid the bad equilibrium. If there were a bad equilibrium with default, we know from the pricing schedule that Q T 1 < (1 )Q T + . In that case the debt accumulation schedule, together with the assumption M B p 0 T s, implies
It can be shown that the right hand side is less than or equal tob, so that B p T b and there cannot be a default equilibrium. The condition that the right hand side is less thanb is
Multiplying both sides by (1 )Q T + , we can rewrite this as (57), which holds if there are multiple equilibria under passive monetary policy.
Notice that M = B p 0 T s is exactly the amount that implements the liquidity support policy described in Section 5. Alternatively, M could be used to buy outstanding debt in the secondary market at any time before time T . The latter would be the buyback policy, also described in Section 5. Table 1 
